Deep neural networks (DNNs) are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial attacks, which are small perturbations added to their input images to mislead their prediction. Detection of adversarial examples is, therefore, a fundamental requirement for robust classification frameworks. In this work, we present a method for detecting such adversarial attacks, which is suitable for any pre-trained neural network classifier. We use influence functions to measure the impact of every training sample on the validation set data. From the influence scores, we find the most supportive training samples for any given validation example. A k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) model fitted on the DNN's activation layers is employed to search for the ranking of these supporting training samples. We observe that these samples are highly correlated with the nearest neighbors of the normal inputs, while this correlation is much weaker for adversarial inputs. We train an adversarial detector using the k-NN ranks and distances and show that it successfully distinguishes adversarial examples, getting state-of-the-art results on four attack methods with three datasets.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vastly employed in both the academy and industry, achieving state-of-the-art results in many domains such as computer vision Krizhevsky et al. [2012] , Schroff et al. [2015] , Voulodimos et al. [2018] , natural language processing Bahdanau et al. [2014] , Kim [2014] , and speech recognition , . However, studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples Goodfellow et al. [2015] , Szegedy et al. [2014] , which are specially crafted perturbations on their input. Adversarial attacks generate such examples that fool machine learning models, inducing them to predict erroneously with high confidence, while being imperceptible to humans. Adversarial subspaces of different DNN classifiers tend to overlap, which makes some adversarial examples generated for a surrogate model fool also other different unseen DNNs Tramer et al. [2017] . This makes adversarial attacks a real threat to any machine learning model and thus should be kept in mind while deploying a DNN.
The vulnerability of neural networks puts into question their usage in sensitive applications, where an opponent may provide modified inputs to cause misidentifications. For this reason, many methods Figure 1 : The correspondence between the helpful examples based on influence functions and the k-nearest neighbours (k-NN) in the embedding space of a DNN can help to distinguish adversarial examples from normal ones. We present (using PCA) the embedding space of a DNN for a normal example (black star) with its adversarial version (brown X) along with their k-NN (k=25) and 25 most helpful samples. Note that for the normal example, the helpful samples highly correlate with the k-NN in the embedding space. Yet, in the adversarial case, these samples are far from each other. This observation leads us to a technique for detecting adversarial attacks.
have been developed to face this challenge. They can be mainly divided into two groups: 1) proactive defense methods, which aim at improving the robustness of DNNs to adversarial examples, and 2) reactive detection techniques that do not change the DNN but rather try to find whether an attack is associated with a certain input or not.
Contribution. In this work, we focus on the reactive detection problem. We propose a novel strategy for detecting adversarial attacks that can be applied to any pre-trained neural network. The core idea of the algorithm is that there should be a correspondence between the training data and the classification of the network. If this relationship breaks then it is very likely that we are in the case of an adversarial input.
To this end, we use two "metrics" to check the impact of the training data on the network decision. The first is influence functions Koh and Liang [2017] , which determines how data points in the training set influence the decision of the network for a given test sample. This metric measures how much a small upweighting of a specific training point in the model's loss function affects the loss of a testing point. Thus, it provides us with a measure of how much a test sample classification is affected by each training sample.
Second, we apply a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) classifier at the embedding space of the network. Various recent works , Döring et al. [2017] , Jiang et al. [2018] , Cohen et al. [2018] demonstrate a high correlation between the network softmax output and the decision of a k-NN applied at the embedding space of this network (where the neighbors are chosen from the training set). They basically show that the network's decision relies on the nearest neighbors resemblance in the embedding space. Thus, the distance in that space may serve as a measure for the effect of an example on the network output.
Given the influence function and k-NN based measures, we turn to combine them together to generate a novel strategy to detect adversarial examples. The rationale behind our approach is that for a normal input, its k-NN training samples (nearest neighbors in the embedding space) and the most helpful training samples (found using the influence function) should correlate. Yet, for adversarial examples this correlation should break and thus, it will serve as an indication that an attack is happening. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship between the k-NN and the most helpful training samples. The black star and brown X denote a normal and its corresponding adversarial image from CIFAR-10 validation set; the plot is of the embedding space projected using PCA fitted on the training set. For each sample (normal/adv), we find its 25 nearest neighbors (blue circles/red downward triangles) in the DNN embedding space; in addition, we find its 25 most helpful training examples from the training set (marked as blue squares and red triangles, respectively). Note that the nearest neighbors and the top most helpful training samples of the normal image are very close in the PCA embedding space, whereas the adversarial image does not exhibit the same correspondence between the training samples.
To check the correlation between the two, we pursue the following strategy: For an unseen input sample, we take the most influential examples from the training set chosen by the influence functions. Then, we check their distance ranking in the embedding space of the network (i.e., what value of k will cause k-NN to take them into account) and their L 2 distance from the input sample's embedding vector. Finally, we use these k-NN features to train a simple Logistic Regression (LR) for detecting whether the input is adversarial or not.
We evaluate our detection strategy on various attack methods and datasets showing its advantage over other leading detection techniques. The results confirm the hypothesis claimed in previous works on the resemblance between k-NN applied on the embedding space and the DNN decision, and show how it can be used for detecting adversarial examples.
Related work
In this section, we briefly review existing papers on adversarial attacks and defenses, and related theory.
Theory: Madry et al. [2018] used the framework of robust optimization and showed results of adversarial training. They found that projected gradient descent (PGD) is an optimal first order adversary, and employing it in the DNN training leads to optimal robustness against any first order attack. Simon-Gabriel et al. [2019] demonstrated that DNNs' vulnerability to adversarial attacks is increased with the gradient of the training loss as a function of the inputs. They also found that this vulnerability does not depend on the DNN model. Fawzi et al. [2017] studied the geometry and complexity of the functions learned by DNNs and provided empirical analysis of the curvatures of their decision boundaries. They showed that a DNN classifier is most vulnerable where its decision boundary is positively curved and that natural images are usually located in the vicinity of flat decision boundaries. These findings are also supported by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017b] , who found that positively curved decision boundaries increase the likelihood that a small universal perturbation would fool a DNN classifier.
Some works provided guarantees to certify robustness of the network. Hein and Andriushchenko [2017] formalized a formal upper bound for the noise required to flip a network prediction, while Sinha et al. [2018] provided an efficient and fast guarantee of robustness for the worst-case population performance, with high probability.
Adversarial attacks: One of the simplest and fastest attack methods is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. [2015] ; in this method the attacker linearly fits the cross entropy loss around the attacked sample and lightly perturbs the image pixels in the direction of the gradient loss. This is a fast one-step attack, which is very easy to deploy on raw input images.
The Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) takes a different approach. Instead of mildly changing all image pixels, this attack is crafted on the L 0 norm, finding one or two pixels which induce the largest change in the loss and modify only them. This is a strong attack, achieving 97% success rate by modifying only 4.02% of the input features on average. Yet, it is iterative and costly.
Deepfool proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016] is a non-targeted attack 1 that creates an adversarial example by moving the attacked input sample to its closest decision boundary, assuming an affine classifier. In reality most DNNs are very non linear, however, the authors used an iterative method, linearizing the classifier around the test sample at every iteration. Compared to FGSM and JSMA, Deepfool performs less perturbations to the input. It was also employed in the Universal Perturbations attack by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017a] , which is an iterative attack that aims at fooling a group of images using the same minimal, universal perturbation applied on all of them. Carlini and Wagner [2017b] proposed a targeted attack 2 (denoted as CW) to impact the defensive distillation method . The CW attack is resilient against most adversarial detection methods. In another work Carlini and Wagner [2017a] provided an optimization framework, which includes a defense-specific loss as a regularization term . This optimization-based attack is argued to be the most effective to date for a white-box threat model, here the adversary knows everything related to the trained DNN: training data, architecture, hyper-parameters, weights, etc.
Adversarial defenses: A wide range of proactive defense approaches have been proposed, including adversarial (re)training Goodfellow et al. [2015] , Kurakin et al. [2017] , Tramèr et al. [2018] , Shaham et al. [2018] , Miyato et al. [2015] , distillation networks , gradient masking Tramèr et al. [2018] , feature squeezing Xu et al. [2018] , network input regularization Ross and Doshi-Velez [2017] , Jakubovitz and Giryes [2018] , output regularization Hein and Andriushchenko [2017] , adjusting weights of correctly predicted labels Rozsa et al. [2018] , and Parseval networks Cisse et al. [2017] .
However, those defenses can be evaded by the optimization-based attack Carlini and Wagner [2017a] , either wholly or partially. Since there are no known intrinsic properties that differentiate adversarial samples from regular images, proactive adversarial defense is extremely challenging. Instead, recent works have focused on reactive adversarial detection methods, which aim at distinguishing adversarial images from natural images, based on features extracted from DNN layers Metzen et al. [2017] , Li and Li [2017] , Rouhani et al. [2018] or from a learned encoder Meng and Chen [2017] . Feinman et al. [2017] proposed a LR detector based on Kernel density and Bayesian uncertainty features. Ma et al. [2018] characterized the dimensional properties of the adversarial subspaces regions and proposed to use a property called Local Intrinsic Dimentionaloty (LID) . LID describes the rate of expansion in the number of data objects as the distance from the reference sample increases. The authors estimated the LID score at every DNN layer using extreme value theory, where the smallest NN distances are considered as extreme events associated with the lower tail of the data samples' underlying distance distribution. Given a pretrained network and a dataset of normal examples, the authors applied on every sample: 1) Adversarial attack. 2) Addition of Gaussian Noise. The natural and noisy images were considered as negative (non-adversarial) class and the adversarial images were considered as positive class. For each image (natural/noisy/adversarial) they calculated a LID score at every DNN layer. Lastly, a LR model was fitted on the LID features for the adversarial detection task. proposed the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN) algorithm to estimate better the prediction, confidence, and credibility for a given test sample. Using a pretrained network, they fitted a k-NN model at every layer. Next, they used a left-out calibration set to estimate the nonconformity of every test sample for label j, counting the number of nearest neighbors along the DNN layer which differs from j. They showed that when an adversarial attack is made on a test sample, the real label displays less correspondence with the k-NN labels from the DNN activations along the layers. Lee et al. [2018] trained generative classifiers using the DNN activations of the training set on every layer to detect adversarial examples by applying a Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score. First, for every class and every layer, they computed the empirical mean and covariance of the activations induced by the training samples. Next, using the above class-conditional Gaussian distributions, they calculated the Mahalanobis distance between a test sample and its nearest class-conditional Gaussian.
1 Non-targeted attacks are adversarial attacks which aim to make the prediction incorrect regardless of the spricifc erroneous class.
2 Targeted attacks are adversarial attacks which aim to make the prediction classified to a particular erroneous class.
These distances are used as features to train a LR classifier for the adversarial detection task. The authors claimed that using the Mahalanobis distance is significantly more effective than the Euclidean distance employed by Ma et al. [2018] and showed improved detection results.
Method
We hypothesize that the DNN predictions are influenced by the k-NN of the training data in their hidden layers, especially in the embedding layer, which is the penultimate activation layer in the DNN classifier. If so, in order to fool the network, an adversarial attack must move the test sample towards a "bad" subspace in the embedding space, where harmful training data can cause the network to misclassify the correct label. To inspect our hypothesis, we fitted a k-NN model on the DNN's activation layers, and also employed the influence functions as used in Koh and Liang [2017] .
Influence functions can interpret a DNN by pointing out which of the training samples helped the DNN to make its prediction, and which training samples were harmful, i.e., inhibited the network from its prediction. Koh and Liang [2017] suggested to measure the influence a train sample z has on the loss of a specific test sample z test , by the term:
where H is the Hessian of the machine learning model, L is its loss, and θ are the model parameters.
For each test example z test , we calculate Eq. (1) per each training example z in the training set. Then, we sort all I up,loss (z, z test ) scores, determining the top M helpful and harmful training examples for a specific z test . Next, for each of the 2xM selected training points we find its rank and distance from the testing example by fitting a k-NN model on the embedding space using all the training examples' embedding vectors. We feed the embedding vector of each test sample z test to the k-NN model to extract all the nearest neighbors' ranks (denoted as R) and distances (denoted D) of the examples in the training set. The R and D features can also be extracted from any other hidden activation layer within the DNN, and not solely from the embedding vector.
are all the ranks and distances of the helpful and harmful training examples, respectively.
We apply an adversarial attack on z test and repeat the aforementioned process on the new, crafted image. Both the normal and adversarial features (
are used to train a LR classifier for the adversarial detection task. The detector training scheme is described in Algorithm 1.
We name our adversarial detection method as Nearest Neighbor Influence Functions (NNIF). We assume that the training, validation, and testing sets are not contaminated with adversarial examples, as in Carlini and Wagner [2017a] . We start by generating an adversarial validation set from the normal validation set (step 4). The M most helpful and harmful training examples associated with the validation image prediction (either normal or adversarial) are found using the influence function in step 22 (see supp. material for the INFLUENCEFUNCTION procedure). The NNIF features are then evaluated by the k-NN model, extracting the ranks and distances (from R and D) of the most influential training points found above. This is done for both the normal validation images (step 8) and for the adversarial images (step 12). This scheme can be carried out on the embedding layer alone, or employed for all L activation layers within the DNN.
Finally, a LR classifier is trained using the NNIF features. Images from the test set are classified to either adversarial (positive) or normal (negative) based on the NNIF features extracted from the M most helpful/harmful training examples, ( for
Get NNIF helpful/harmful features for normal images 9:
end for 11:
Get NNIF helpful/harmful features for adversarial images 13:
end for 15: end for
Collecting nearest neighbors features 20:
Initialize: 
get indices of the 2xM most influencing training samples. This procedure is presented in the supp. material. 
correlation between them and the image's most helpful/harmful training examples using the influence functions.
Results
This section shows the power of our NNIF adversarial detector against four adversarial attack strategies: FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, and CW (using L 2 norm), as introduced in Section 2. We selected these attacks for our experiments due to their effectiveness, diversity, and popularity. We applied these attacks on three datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 Krizhevsky [2009] , and SVHN Netzer et al. [2011] . NNIF performance is compared to the state-of-the-art LID and Mahalanobis detectors (Section 2) and also to the DkNN adversarial detector (Section 3). Before presenting our results, we first describe the experimental setup used in our analysis.
Experimental setup
Training and Testing: Each of the three image datasets was divided into three subsets: training set, validation set, and testing set, containing 49k, 1k, and 10k images respectively. Since our NNIF method is time consuming (especially the procedure INFLUENCEFUNCTION in Algorithm 1), we randomly selected 49k and 1k training and validation samples, respectively, from the official SVHN training set and 10k testing samples from the official SVHN testing set. Any validation or testing image not correctly classified by the DNN was discarded. For every image in the validation and testing sets, we generated adversarial examples using the four attack methods (FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW), as describe in Step 4 in Algorithm 1. Then, an equal number of normal and adversarial validation images were used to train a LR classifier, which was later applied on the remaining testing images for calculating the detectors metrics. We used the cleverhans library to carry out all the adversarial attacks. The image RGB values were scaled to [0, 1].
Since the DkNN method requires a calibration set, we randomly selected 33% of the validation set examples (after discarding the misclassifications) for calibrating it. Note that although Papernot and McDaniel showed that the nearest neighbors can qualitatively detect adversarial attacks (see Fig. 7 in ), they did not formalize an adversarial detector. We employ their empirical p-values as features for the adversarial detection task.
Training DNNs: We trained all DNNs on the training set while decaying the learning rate using the validation set's accuracy score. All the DNNs used in our experiments are Resnet-34 He et al.
[2016] with global average pooling layer prior to the embedding space. The embedding vector was multiplied by a fully-connected layer for the logits calculation. We trained all three datasets for 200 epochs, with L 2 weight regularization of 0.0004, using a Stochastic Gradient Decent optimizer with momentum 0.9 and Nesterov updates. For evaluation we used the model checkpoint with the best (highest) validation accuracy on the image classification task. We follow the checklist in Carlini et al. [2019] and report the full DNN validation/test accuracies for the clean models when not under attack and the attacks success rates (see supp. material). These DNNs perform close to the state-of-the-art and thus are sufficient for being used in an adversarial study without fine tuning Feinman et al. [2017] .
Parameter tuning: The number of neighbors (k) for LID and DkNN, the noise magnitude ( ) for the Mahalanobis method, and the number of top influence samples to collect (M ) for NNIF were chosen using nested cross validation within the validation set, based on the AUC values of the detection ROC curve. We tuned k for DkNN using an exhaustive grid search between [10, N/#classes], where N is the dataset size and #classes is the number of classes. For LID the number of nearest neighbors was tuned using a grid search over the range [10, 40) while using a minibatch size of 100 (as in Ma et al. [2018] ). For the Mahalanobis method we tuned using an exhaustive grid search in log-space between [1E −5 , 1E −2 ], and M was tuned using a grid search over [10, 500] . The selected parameters are presented in the supp. material.
Running INFLUENCEFUNCTION in Algorithm 1 for an entire training set is very slow. Thus, for every testing set we randomly selected only 10k out of the 49k samples in the training set and calculated I up,loss (Eq. (1)) just for them. Although this is a coarse approximation of the real nearest neighbors distribution in the training set on the DNN embedding space, this approximation is sufficient for achieving new state-of-the-art adversarial detection. We emphasize that this approximation was done only for the testing set, and not for the validation set.
Activation layers: The LID, Mahalanobis, and NNIF detectors can be trained using either features from the embedding space alone or using all the activation layers in the network. The DkNN detector portrays very poor results when it is applied on all the DNN's features (data not shown) and therefore, we present all the DkNN results by training features from the embedding space alone. Figure 2 shows the discrimination power (AUC score) of the four inspected adversarial detectors: DkNN (black), LID (blue), Mahalabolis (green) and NNIF (red), on three popular datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN. We compare between the detection scores calculated for four adversarial attacks: FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW. The solid bars correspond to detections where only the penultimate activation layer was utilized. In some cases, considering all the layers in the DNN activations boosts the LID/Mahalanobis/NNIF scores; this is portrayed as a complementary hatched patterned bar above the solid bar.
Detection of adversarial attacks
Our method surpasses all other detectors for distinguishing Deepfool and CW attacks, for all the datasets. On FGSM and JSMA our NNIF detector also demonstrates state-of-the-art results, matching the Mahalanobis detector's performance. Table 1 summarizes the AUC scores of the detectors using features from all the DNN's activation layers. The only exception is the DkNN method, which is employed only on the embedding space. In the supp. material, we provide a similar table for the obtained AUC scores using only the DNN's penultimate layer. 
Ablation study
To quantify the contribution of each one of the features (
on the NNIF method performance, we conducted an ablation study on CIFAR-10 dataset, detecting FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW adversarial attacks. Table 2 shows the AUC and accuracy results for Deepfool attack using features from the DNN's embedding space only. The complete table with all the attacks is presented in the supp. material.
Our analysis shows that the most influential feature is D M ↑ , which is the L 2 distance from the most helpful training examples on the embedding space. In most cases, our NNIF detector performance using D M ↑ is nearly as good as the performance upon utilizing all four features. The least important feature is R M ↓ , which barely helps the adversarial detection. Intuitively it makes sense because we have noticed that the classes of the most harmful training examples always differ from the normal examples' class and mostly differ from the adversarial examples' class, and thus their rankings (R M ↓ ) are expected to be high for both cases (normal/adversarial). On the other hand, the distances from the most harmful training examples (D M ↓ ) are beneficial for the detection. The most helpful ranks (R M ↑ ) is a beneficial feature when used by itself, alas incorporating it with D M ↑ did not improve the results. We therefore deduce that the information added by R M ↑ can already be inferred from D M ↑ in our detector.
We also show that the features
We calculated the probability density functions for these three features on CIFAR-10, applying the Deepfool and CW attacks (shown in the supp. material). From these histograms it can be easily observed that R M ↑ or D M ↑ are more useful for detecting Deepfool adversarial attacks than CW ones. On the other hand, the D M ↓ feature discriminates CW attacks better than Deepfool ones.
A deployment of any learning based detector on systems is risky since an attacker could potentially have access to the LR classifier's parameters. Thus, it is helpful to deploy instead a detector which inspects only one feature and applies a simple thresholding. Our results show that this scheme is possible with NNIF using only the D M ↑ feature for all attacks.
Generalization to other attacks
To evaluate how well our detection method can be transferred to unseen attacks, we trained LR classifiers on the features obtained using the FGSM attack, and then evaluated the classifies on JSMA, Deepfool, and CW attacks. The AUC scores are shown in Table 3 . It can be observed that our NNIF method shows the best generalization on Deepfool and CW, however the Mahalanobis method transferred better to the JSMA attack. Table 3 results were collected using only the penultimate layer in the DNN (the embedding vector); we provide a similar generalization table with all the DNN layers in the supp. material. Notice that the generalization is weaker for all methods in this case. In this paper, we addressed the task of detecting adversarial attacks. We showed that for normal (untempered) images, there exists a strong correlation between their nearest neighbors in the DNN's embedding space and their most helpful training examples, found using influence functions. Our empirical results show that the L 2 distance from a test image embedding vector to its most helpful training inputs (D M ↑ ) is a strong measure for the detection of adversarial examples. The aforementioned distance combined with the nearest neighbors ranking order of the training inputs were used to achieve a new state-of-the-art adversarial detection performance for sophisticated attacks (Deepfool and CW) on three datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN.
One possible avenue for future research is to inspect how the nearest neighbors are correlated with the most helpful/harmful training examples using different distance metrics or by employing a transform on the DNN embedding vectors. We emphasize that we used the L 2 distance throughout our analysis, thus, we suspect that using another distance metric such as Mahalanobis Lee et al. [2018] could improve our results further.
Another open issue for future research is the long computation time, which is required to calculate the influence functions for the entire training set. It is obvious that in order to deploy our NNIF algorithm, a significant improvement in computation time is needed, especially for real time applications or systems, which mandate fast detection pace. A possible solution to this problem may be a form of hash map from the nearest neighbors to the most influence training examples. Every training example can be encoded with a probability vector for its influence on a specific class; then, instead of employing a simple k-NN search in the embedding space, we can average over the probability of each class.
A Method
The main paper proposes a new reactive detection method for adversarial images: the Nearest Neighbors Influence Functions (NNIF). Our detector utilizes a influence functions algorithm as shown in Koh and Liang [2017] to measure the contribution of each training sample to a test samples prediction. Their algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. For measuring the influence a train sample z has on the loss of a specific test sample z test , Koh and Liang [2017] approximate I up,loss (z, z test ) in Eq. (1), where H is the Hessian of the machine learning model, L is its loss, and θ are the model parameters. Eq. (1) 
B Experimental setup
The DNNs clean accuracies, when not under attack, are shown in Table 4 . The FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW success rates are shown in Table 5 . Note that the success rates of all attacks are higher for CIFAR-100. This makes sense since CIFAR-100 dataset has 100 classes instead of 10, and it is thus more vulnerable to misclassifications.
The paper explains how we tuned the hyper-parameters for the four inspected algorithms: DkNN, LID, Mahalanobis, and our NNIF method.
For the DkNN and LID algorithms we tuned the number of neighbors (k), for the Mahalanobis algorithm we tuned the noise magnitude ( ), and for our NNIF method we set the number of top influence samples to collect (M ). All parameters were chosen using nested cross entropy validation within the validation set, based on the AUC values of the detection ROC curve. The results are shown in Table 6 . Table 7 presents the AUC scores for the adversarial detection of FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW attacks on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN datasets. These results was obtained by using DNN's Defending Carlini-Wagner (CW) L 2 attack. All plots correspond to the CIFAR-10 dataset. We achieve state-of-the-art results, surpassing previous defense methods by a large margin. To inspect how the four learned features influence our adversarial detection we conducted an ablation study on CIFAR-10 dataset, for all the attacks: fast gradient sign method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. [2015] , Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) , Deepfool MoosaviDezfooli et al. [2016] , and Carlini Wagner (CW) attack Carlini and Wagner [2017b] . The results are shown in Table 8 . From these results, one may conclude that the most beneficial feature is D M ↑ , which is the L 2 distance from the most helpful training examples on the deep neural network (DNN) embedding space. Figure 4 shows the probability density functions for R M ↑ , D M ↑ , and D M ↓ features on CIFAR-10 for the Deepfool and CW adversarial attacks. From these histograms, it can be easily observed that R M ↑ or D M ↑ are more useful for detecting Deepfool adversarial attacks than CW attacks. On the other hand, the D M ↓ feature discriminates CW attacks better than Deepfool attacks. This is also supported by the results on 
E Generalization to other attacks
The main paper measures the NNIF method transferability from one attack (FGSM) to other, unseen attacks (JSMA, Deepfool, and CW), where all the features are extracted from the penultimate activation layer. Here we provide a similar table where all the DNN's activation layers are employed for this comparison (Table 9) , except of DkNN which only utilizes features from the DNN's embedding space.
The generalization results in Table 9 does not have a definite winner method. The DkNN, Mahalanobis, and our NNIF methods demonstrate the best transferability for various setups. The LID detector does not generalize as good as the others for any setup. 
